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Abstract 
European banks hold 10% of their total assets in portfolios that give rise to unrealised gains and 
losses which under Basel III will no longer be allowed to be removed from banks’ regulatory 
capital. Using a sample of European banks, and taking advantage of the different treatment 
afforded, under Basel II, to such gains and losses among jurisdictions and instruments and over 
time, we find evidence that: a) the inclusion of unrealised gains and losses in capital ratios 
increases their volatility; b) the partial inclusion of unrealised gains and total inclusion of losses on 
fixed-income securities in regulatory capital, compared with the complete exclusion of both 
(neutralisation), reduces the volume of securities categorised as Available For Sale (AFS), thus 
potentially affecting liquidity management and demand for bonds (most of which are currently 
government bonds); and c) the higher the partial inclusion of gains from debt instruments, the 
lower the holdings of such instruments in the AFS category and the higher the regulatory Tier 1 
capital ratio, thus affecting banks’ capital buffer strategy. We do not find evidence that the 
removal of neutralisation would impact capital ratios. 
Keywords: prudential regulation, regulatory capital, fair value accounting, prudential filters. 
JEL Classification: G21, M41. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
El 10  % de los activos totales de los bancos europeos se encuentra en carteras que generan ganancias y 
pérdidas no realizadas que bajo Basilea III dejarán de poder ser eliminadas del capital regulatorio de los 
bancos. Utilizando una muestra de bancos europeos, y aprovechando la heterogeneidad que bajo 
Basilea II se da al tratamiento de las ganancias y pérdidas entre jurisdicciones, entre los instrumentos 
financieros que las generan y a lo largo del tiempo, encontramos evidencia de que: a) la inclusión de las 
ganancias y pérdidas no realizadas en las ratios de capital aumenta su volatilidad; b) la admisión parcial 
de las ganancias no realizadas junto con la inclusión de todas las pérdidas asociadas a valores de 
renta fija en el capital regulatorio reduce el volumen de los títulos clasificados como disponibles para la 
venta (AFS), en relación con la situación de exclusión completa de ambos (neutralización). Por lo tanto, 
el tratamiento de la deuda potencialmente afecta a la gestión de la liquidez y a la demanda de bonos 
(la mayoría de los cuales es actualmente deuda pública); c) cuanto mayor sea la proporción de las 
ganancias no realizadas derivadas de instrumentos de deuda incluidas en el capital, menor será la 
tenencia de dichos instrumentos en la categoría AFS y mayor será la ratio de capital Tier1, por lo que 
su tratamiento también afecta a la estrategia de los bancos sobre colchones de capital. No 
encontramos evidencia de que la desaparición de la neutralización pueda afectar a las ratios de capital. 
Palabras clave: regulación prudencial, capital regulatorio, contabilidad a valor razonable, filtros 
prudenciales.  
Códigos JEL: G21, M41. 
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1 Introduction 
According to Basel II regulation, it was possible to remove from banks’ regulatory capital 
unrealised gains or losses recognised on the balance sheet as “other comprehensive income” 
(OCI) through the application of a so called Prudential Filter. The main objective of these 
adjustments was to reduce a source of volatility and uncertainty, arising from the changes in 
the fair value of banks’ securities portfolio (Chisnall, 2000; Allen and Carletti, 2008; Heaton et 
al., 2010), so as to preserve some of the characteristics of regulatory capital desired by 
supervisors in terms of quality1
However, the crisis has generated a debate on whether prudential filters have been 
an obstacle to the early identification of problems (Laux, 2012). Filters allow for some losses 
not to be recognised in the income statement, thus generating overstated balances in a crisis 
that can lead banks to take riskier positions as regulatory capital appears to be sufficient. The 
inclusion of unrealised gains and losses, whether or not they are temporary, may introduce 
bank regulatory discipline, as it acknowledges the underlying position. 
.  
Under Basel III this filter would no longer be available, which justifies the focus of the 
proposed analysis. The relevance of this change will depend on the amount of such gains and 
losses that are to be removed, the majority of which correspond to those arising from 
Available for Sale (AFS) securities, i.e. securities that are bought with the intention of not 
actively trading with them.  
On average, 10% of total assets of European banks are held in portfolios that give rise 
to such gains and losses, while for most jurisdictions, the largest amount of AFS securities 
(around 80%) are debt securities. As the EU Capital Requirements Regulation is aligned with the 
Basel III proposal, with the final treatment that unrealised gains are to receive still under 
discussion, the potential impact of the new approach in EU banks can be rather large.  
US and European banks have claimed that the removal of such filters would be 
associated with higher capital volatility, and that the greater uncertainty associated to an 
unfiltered approach would give rise to larger capital buffers and lower holdings of liquid assets 
(ABA et al. 2012, EBF, 2012). However, such effects would not preclude the desired 
regulatory objective of increased transparency and risk sensitivity in the face of liquidity 
shocks2
The purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence on banks’ claims. In 
particular it aims at analysing the impact of prudential filters on the relative size of the AFS 
portfolio and on regulatory capital, using data of European banks from 2005 to 2013. It 
focuses on the impact of the different prudential filters for unrealized fair value gains and 
losses of AFS assets, using publicly available data on prudential filters and banks’ financial 
accounts. This project tries to provide evidence on whether banks’ behaviour is consistent 
. Moreover, capital ratios would move with the cycle, increasing in booms and falling 
in recessions, thus potentially affecting financial stability. 
                                                                            
1. Regulatory capital is expected to be permanent, readily available to absorb losses, reliable, and indisputable as to its 
amount. See BCBS (2015) for a literature review of the interplay of accounting and regulation and its impact on bank 
behavior. 
2. See EBA (2013) for a discussion of the arguments in favour and against the introduction of a prudential filter for 
unrealised gains.  
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with addressing regulatory risk and in particular with the search for more stable regulatory 
capital. If this were the case, the Basel III proposal to remove the filter would affect capital and 
liquidity management.  
First, we investigate whether the inclusion of unrealised gains and losses arising from 
fair value instruments increases the volatility of capital. We could expect large movements in 
capital under turbulent financial markets if there are no filters, which could give rise to costly 
changes in banks’ investment and risk management behaviour. 
Second, we test whether European banks have different portfolio composition when 
they face different prudential filters. We analyse the relationship between portfolio composition 
and the treatment of unrealised gains and losses applied in European jurisdictions during the 
period 2005-2013. To carry out the empirical analysis, we take advantage of the 
heterogeneity of treatment in the different jurisdictions and in relation to different financial 
instruments and the changes that have been implemented in such treatment.  
And finally, we examine whether regulatory capital is affected by the type and 
amount of the prudential filters, under the assumption that regulatory risk increases with the 
absence of these filters. As far as banks try to minimise the probability of breaching minimum 
regulatory ratios we can expect different actual capital ratios under different prudential 
frameworks, even taking into account the counterbalancing effect of the economic cycle. 
We gather evidence that the implementation of Basel III in relation to filtering may 
have an effect on capital buffers and investment decisions. In particular, we find evidence that 
a) if the AFS filter had been removed from capital during the period 2005 to 2013, so that 
unrealised gains and losses would have been fully recognised in capital, the changes in 
capital ratios would have been much larger than those actually observed; b) if unrealised 
gains and losses from fixed income securities are not admitted in regulatory capital 
(neutralised), banks hold a higher proportion of AFS assets in relation to securities valued at 
fair value than if losses are recognised and gains are fully, partially or not recognised at all; c) 
the proportion of gains from debt instruments that are allowed to be recognised in regulatory 
capital when losses are fully recognised reduces the weight of AFS debt on total assets at fair 
value; d) the regulatory capital ratios of banks subject to debt neutralisation, when controlling 
for other determinants, are lower than the ratios for banks that are subject to an asymmetric 
filter, but the difference is not statistically significant and e) observed regulatory capital ratios 
are higher, the larger the proportion of unrealised gains from debt allowed to be recognised 
as own funds, after taking into account the economic cycle. 
We conclude that the removal of the filters will be accompanied by increased capital 
volatility which will result in changes in banks’ investment and capital strategy. On the one 
hand, we will observe a decline in AFS holdings of debt instruments by banks. As far as a 
high proportion of these instruments are government bonds, a contraction of trading in these 
markets could result. As a higher proportion of assets would be classified in other categories 
such as Held for Trading or Held to Maturity, liquidity management would become more 
costly. On the other hand, banks would be willing to hold higher capital buffers which would 
either require raising additional capital or reducing risk weighted assets, thus possibly 
affecting lending decisions. 
Our research is linked to the literature that has been devoted to analyse whether 
banks use financial reporting discretion to circumvent capital adequacy requirements or to 
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smooth earnings. In particular, it is related to the analysis of the reporting on gains and losses 
on asset sales as an accounting choice. To our knowledge, it is the first study that analyses 
banks reaction to prudential filters using European bank data. The paper also contributes to 
the field of research that focuses on the interaction of fair value accounting and capital 
regulation (Laux and Leuz 2009). 
Several studies, centered on the USA experience, do not find conclusive evidence of 
a significant association between regulatory capital and gains and losses on securities sales 
(Beatty et al. (1995), or Collins et al. (1995)), while other studies find evidence consistent with 
banks using realised securities gains and losses to increase regulatory capital (Moyer (1990)) 
or to smooth it (Barth et al. 2014).  
As for the impact of regulation and accounting on portfolio composition, Chircop 
and Novotny-Farkas (2014), with data for the USA, conclude that AFS holdings would 
decline with the removal of the Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI) filter. 
The studies that analyse banks’ reaction to the adoption of the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards Number 115 (SFAS 115) in the US in 1993, by which equity 
accounts had to be adjusted to reflect changes in securities at fair value, show that banks 
classify less securities as AFS if unrealised gains and losses on these securities directly 
affect regulatory capital (Beatty (1995) and Hodder et al (2002)). Empirical evidence has 
also been gathered on the reaction of banks to the option to abandon fair value recognition 
for selected financial assets that was granted in October 2008 (amendment to IAS 39). In 
particular, the analysis presented in Bischoff et al. 2011, with US data, supports the 
hypothesis that the less restrictive the prudential filter for unrealised gains from AFS assets 
is, the greater the incentive to use the reclassification option when a bank expects a 
decrease in the fair value of the AFS asset. With European data, Fiechter (2011) finds that 
banks used such reclassification to improve their key financial indicators. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a 
summary description of the current regulatory and accounting treatment of financial assets 
that are classified as AFS. Section 3 discusses the analytical framework and Section 4 the 
empirical strategy. Section 5 is devoted to the results on capital volatility while Section 6 and 
7 present the results on the impact of the neutralisation and the asymmetric filter, 
respectively.  Section 8 presents some robustness checks and Section 9 concludes. The 
Annex contains a Table with country data.  
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2 Treatment of financial assets and regulatory capital 
Assets that are categorised as available for sale (AFS), so that banks do not have the intention 
of actively trading with them, but that can be sold as desired, are required to be measured at 
fair value3
CEBS Guidelines on Prudential Filters for Regulatory Purposes issued in December 
2004
. Changes in such fair value are to be recorded as gain or loss in a separate 
component of shareholders’ equity called “Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income”. 
From a prudential regulation perspective accumulated unrealised gains and losses from AFS 
assets may be subject to filtering for prudential purposes, with major differences across 
countries on the type of filter applied. That is, such unrealised gains or losses do not need to 
be fully reflected in regulatory capital. 
4
So, if the guidance was followed the main differences across jurisdictions would arise 
in a) the treatment of debt instruments (whether the jurisdiction applied the treatment for 
equity or the neutralisation one); b) the haircut to be applied on unrealised gains recognised in 
Tier2 capital and c) whether such haircut would be the same for equity than for debt 
instruments
 were to be applied in European member states on a best effort basis by national 
supervisors. The Guidelines established that fair value changes for the AFS financial 
instruments, should receive a differentiated treatment that would depend on the type of 
financial instruments, and on whether it was a loss or a gain. In particular, for equity 
instruments, unrealised losses would be fully subtracted from capital and unrealised gains 
added at least partly in Tier2 capital (See Table 1). The part that had to be added was at least 
the tax effect. So that equity instruments were subject to a so-called asymmetric approach. 
Other AFS financial instruments, mostly debt instruments or financial instruments subject to 
interest rate risk had to be treated as either equity or follow the “neutralization” approach, by 
which neither unrealised gains nor losses were to be recognised in regulatory capital.  
5
 
.  So, differences in filters applied in different jurisdictions could be rather large. 
We take advantage of such heterogeneity to carry out the analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                                            
3. Held for Trading (HFT) instruments, which are held for trading purpose, are also measured at fair value and their value 
changes are recognized in the Profit and Loss account. Held to maturity (HTM) securities which are bought with the 
intention of retaining them until the maturity date are measured at amortised cost. If instruments classified as HTM are 
sold, the bank is penalised. 
4. CEBS Guidelines covered also cash flow hedge reserve; own credit risk; AFS equities, loans and receivables, other 
AFS assets; own used and investment properties. CEBS/04/91; https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/own-
funds/guidelines-on-on-prudential-filters-for-regulatory-capital. 
5. Another difference is the choice between the portfolio-approach that aggregates all unrealised gains, versus the item 
by item approach, which is not analysed in this study. Moreover, CEBS Report (CEBS, 2007) showed that differences in 
implementation also resulted from whether a pre or a post tax approach had been followed. We normalize the data with 
expost   treatment 
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TABLE 1. PRUDENTIAL FILTERS IN EUROPEAN  
COUNTRIES: INCLUSION OF UNREALISED GAINS  
AND LOSSES FROM AFS ASSETS IN REGULATORY CAPITAL 
  
  
INCLUDED  
IN REGULATORY CAPITAL 
  
  TYPE OF 
FILTER 
 
unrealised  
losses  
unrealised  
gains 
  
  
  
  
from AFS debt 
  
neutralisation 
NO 
 
NO 
  
  
  
  
from AFS debt/equity 
  
asymmetric YES 
 
NO/ONLY 
PARTIALLY 
  
  Basel III 
proposal:  
no filter 
 
YES 
 
YES 
  
              
 
The potential relevance that the actual application of filters may have on observed 
capital can be captured by proxying the weight that net unrealised gains on AFS assets may 
have on capital ratios. Graphs 1 and 2 compare for debt and equity the average addition or 
subtraction to the capital ratio the filtered and the non filtered approach would have implied, 
ceteris paribus, in the period 2005-2013 by country, for those banks for which such 
information is available. 
We observe that net unrealised gains on debt (Graph 1) have a larger impact on 
banks’ capital than net unrealised gains on equity (Graph 2) when averaging the effect on 
banks by countries, because of the weight that the former have on assets. The additional 
capital arising from net unrealised gains from debt if there had not been any filters, would 
have not exceeded 0.8 percentage points on a country average, while the subtraction of 
losses would have not been larger than 2 percentage points. However, on an individual bank 
basis these figures are much larger, as they could account for declines up to 12.5 percentage 
points or increases up to 5.9 percentage points in the case of all net unrealised gains in AFS 
debt assets being transferred to capital.  
The impact on capital through equity net gains is much smaller, just going above 
0.20 points as additions and not surpassing -0.5 for subtractions in terms of country average. 
As before, individual bank data show that the impact is much larger, with reductions of 1.7 
percentage points or increases up to 4.8 percentage points when considering all unrealised 
gains and losses arising from AFS equity. Banks in 12 out of the 17 countries included in the 
sample have experienced on average declines in their capital ratios as a result of their holding 
of AFS equity in their portfolio. Such figure would reduce to 8 if there had been no filters, as 
more unrealised gains would have been allowed to be included.  
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3 Analytical framework 
We assume that banks have the objective of minimising regulatory risk arising from capital 
fluctuations, thus minimising regulatory capital compliance cost6
We have argued that the lack of filters introduces higher volatility in regulatory 
capital than under a filtered environment, which banks, wishing to minimise regulatory risk, 
will try to counterbalance. We assume that banks facing the risk of not meeting minimum 
capital requirements because of such additional volatility can react in two ways. On the one 
hand, they may hold a larger buffer over regulatory capital requirements so as to reduce the 
probability of hitting such minimum in spite of incurring larger capital fluctuations. On the 
other, they may reorganise their portfolio to stabilise their capital, thus reducing their 
holdings of instruments generating or contributing to capital volatility. In the latter case, we 
could expect that the existence and intensity of filters could affect the total volume of 
instruments generating gains or losses that can be subject to filtering that banks are willing 
to hold in their portfolio. We postulate that, in general, we would observe that in those 
jurisdictions without filters, the weight of financial instruments potentially generating gains 
and losses that can be filtered is less than in those jurisdictions where such filters exist. We 
also postulate that we will observe larger capital buffers in jurisdictions without filters, 
except if the procyclical effect of gains and losses counterbalances such reaction
.  
7
We propose analysing the differential effect of, on the one hand, being subject to an 
asymmetric framework in relation to being subject to the so called “neutralisation” approach 
and, on the other hand, of being subject to an asymmetric approach in relation to a non-
filtered framework. Table 2 summarises the expected effects on the proportion of AFS 
instruments in the portfolio and on the regulatory capital ratio of changing from an asymmetric 
treatment to a neutralization framework and to a non-filtered approach in the first row and 
from neutralization to a non filtered framework in the second row.  
. We 
could observe either or both of such reactions. 
As for the first comparison, and as far as AFS holdings do provide a net benefit, in 
terms of liquidity management and as a hedging instrument, we would expect higher 
securities classified as AFS in banks that are subject to a neutralisation approach than in 
banks that are subject to asymmetric treatment. Under neutralisation, banks may capture all 
the benefits arising from AFS holdings without having to face its costs, in terms of regulatory 
risk. Moreover, as under an asymmetrical approach, unrealised losses are systematically 
translated into less regulatory capital, while unrealised gains are not, we can expect larger 
buffers in banks subject to such filters than in banks operating under a neutralization 
approach. A neutralisation approach minimizes or eliminates the pro-cyclical impact of 
accounting on bank capital regulation, and isolates capital from valuation fluctuations, thus 
reducing the incentives to hold a larger capital buffer and effectively reducing regulatory risk. 
                                                                            
6. Models that postulate that banks try to maximise the return on equity to satisfy their investors do not predict any 
capital buffer, even in the face of increased capital volatility (Adrian and Shin,2010). Banks would be expected to operate 
at the capital requirement level.  The short term focus would also support banks’ taking higher risk in the face of higher 
volatility, thus increasing their holdings of assets that give rise to higher variation when filters are removed. Under such 
an approach, high returns can be appropriated by bank managers and shareholders in the form of extra profits, while 
very low returns cause insolvency and consequently losses either for depositors or deposit insurance 
agencies.(Suárez,1998)  
7. Thus, following the Basel III proposal of removing filters on unrealised gains and losses of financial assets measured at 
fair value would result in less AFS and/or more HTM instruments and higher capital ratios. 
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Therefore, we can expect that banks that are subject to neutralisation will show higher AFS 
debt holdings and lower capital ratios than banks operating in jurisdictions that apply an 
asymmetric treatment to unrealised gains and losses (upper left end of Table 2). 
 
On the other hand, there is more volatility and thus larger regulatory risk under a non 
filtered approach than under an asymmetrically filtered one. In fact, if the filter is complete only 
losses are going to affect regulatory capital. Thus we could expect less AFS holdings if the 
filter is not there so as to reduce such induced volatility in capital. Moreover, we would also 
observe higher capital buffers on average under an unfiltered approach to face increased 
regulatory risk (upper right end of Table 2). The same arguments would hold when changing 
from a neutralization framework to a non-filtered one (lower right end of Table 2). 
TABLE 2. EXPECTED EFFECT ON CAPITAL AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION WHEN 
CHANGING THE TYPE OF PRUDENTIAL FILTER APPLIED 
      
  
TOWARDS 
    
  neutralization 
  
no filter 
 (Basel III proposal) 
    
% of AFS 
instruments  
regulatory 
capital 
  
% of AFS 
instruments  
regulatory 
capital 
  
FR
O
M
 + asymmetric filter - 
 
- + 
  
 
neutralization 
 
  - + 
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4 Empirical strategy 
We use the values for the prudential filters applied in European countries obtained from the 
surveys carried out in 2005, 2007 and 2009 by CEBS (CEBS, 2007) and the 2009 update. 
We normalise the filters to their after tax expression, using the corporate tax rates provided by 
EUROSTAT for those jurisdictions that define the filters in relation to before tax unrealised 
gains. As we use after tax filters, some of the observed changes in filters are not regulatory 
driven, but arise from changes in tax rates.  
As reflected in Table 3, with data for the prudential filters actually applied in EU 
countries in 2007, seven out of the eighteen jurisdictions included in the sample made use of 
the neutralization approach for debt in 2007, and five additional jurisdictions did not allow the 
inclusion of any part of unrealised gains on debt into regulatory capital, although losses had to 
be deducted. Similarly, eight did not allow the inclusion of any part of unrealised gains arising 
from equity instruments into regulatory capital, although requiring the deduction of all 
unrealised losses arising from these instruments. Five countries applied a different treatment 
to unrealised gains arising from debt than those arising from equity. So, there is heterogeneity 
in the treatment of unrealised gains on financial instruments among countries in the European 
area, in the treatment of unrealised losses on debt and between equity and debt within a 
same jurisdiction and changes along the time dimension8
  
. 
                                                                            
8. Portugal and Germany changed in 2009 from the asymmetrical to the neutralization approach, while Spain and Italy 
introduced the change in 2010. Luxembourg allowed choice of treatment from 2009 (we assume neutralization is 
chosen since). 
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TABLE 3.  
PRUDENTIAL FILTERS IN EUROPEAN  
COUNTRIES. 2007 
(% of gains admitted in regulatory capital) 
  
Arising from 
AFS equity 
Arising from 
AFS debt 
neutralization  
of debt instruments 
AUSTRIA 30 30 NO 
BELGIUM 10 0 YES 
CYPRUS 0 0 NO 
FINLAND 0 0 NO 
FRANCE 31.4 0 YES 
GERMANY 26.59 30 NO 
IRELAND 0 0 NO* 
ITALY 50 50 NO 
LUXEMBOURG 0 0 NO 
MALTA 0 0 NO 
NETHERLAND 0 0 YES 
NORWAY 37.5 0 YES 
PORTUGAL 38.78 40 NO 
SLOVAKIA 0 0 YES 
SLOVENIA 20 0 YES 
SPAIN 33.33 48.15 NO 
UNITED KINGDOM 0 0 YES 
MEAN 26.88 24.66   
*choice of treatment, subject to consistent application 
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The empirical analysis is applied to consolidated annual data, publicly provided by 
SNL, for the period 2005 to 2013 for at most 159 banks, excluding subsidiaries of the same 
group, whose distribution among 17 European jurisdictions can be found on Table A.1 of the 
Annex. Data availability defines the sample size for each specification. We assume that since 
2009, no changes to the filters have been implemented, except for the change to 
neutralisation in debt and changes arising from tax modifications.  
We first test whether the inclusion of all fair value unrealised gains and losses 
would have had an impact on the volatility of regulatory capital if they would have been 
allowed to be recognised. We expect that such recognition would have implied an increase 
in overall capital volatility.  
For this part, we compute volatility measures for capital ratios with and without filters 
and compare them.  
We then analyse the impact of neutralisation on both portfolio composition and 
capital. Given that neutralisation can only discretionally be applied to fixed income securities 
we focus the analysis of the effects of this type of filter on the portfolio of debt instruments. 
We estimate robust regressions with portfolio composition and capital as dependent variables 
and the filter variable as the explanatory variable of interest. 
Finally, we analyse the impact of the asymmetric filter on portfolio composition and 
capital and cover both debt and equity instruments, using a similar approach. 
Our basic specification for the analysis of the impact of filters on portfolio 
composition and capital uses a difference in difference approach so as to be able to interpret 
the effect of the prudential filters, which may change by year and jurisdiction, in terms of 
causality9
We postulate that the determinants of portfolio composition (1) and capital ratios (2) 
can be expressed as alternative specifications of equations of the form:  
. In particular, when we analyse the impact of neutralization, we define the AFS 
prudential filter variable neutral as the interaction term of the country dummy and the years 
when neutralisation was in place. That is, the prudential filter variable would take value 1 all 
the years in a given jurisdiction when neutralisation of debt instruments was applied and 0 
when any other treatment was in place. When we analyse the effects of the different levels of 
the quantitative asymmetric filter, the AFS prudential filter variables (debt_filter and equi_filter) 
are specified as the interaction between country and the filter size, so that it would have 
different values for a given jurisdiction over time. In particular, the larger the value of these filter 
variables is, the lower the filtered amount of unrealised gains is. 
(1) taikt = α0 i + α1  AFS Prudential Filterikt + Σ αj Controlsikt-1 + εikt 
(2) kikt = β0i + β1 AFS Prudential Filterikt + Σ βj Controlsikt-1 + εikt 
where tajkt is the indicator of bank i’s trading activity in country k at time t, that we proxy as 
the proportion of assets than can be subject to filtering over fair value assets and kikt would be 
                                                                            
9. We must remember that the initial regulatory situation of different jurisdictions is not identical; that different jurisdictions 
have chosen different dates to carry out the intervention (the regulatory change) and that the implemented changes are 
not identical for all jurisdictions. 
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the capital ratio of bank i in country k at time t. Our parameters of interest would be α1 and 
β1and we would test for their statistical significance and sign.  
The equations would also include a set of j control variables that are bank and time 
dependent or that are country dependent. In particular, we would use in the portfolio 
equation, individual bank data to capture risk appetite, size, and idiosyncratic volatility as well 
as economic growth and banks’ profitability, size, business model, liquidity and 
macroeconomic variables such as economic growth in the capital equation. 
We first estimate these equations by OLS on the pooled sample including year and 
country dummies, to control for common country and time unobservable effects. In order to 
control for banks’ fixed effects  (that would be captured by α0i ) we also estimate the 
equations using a fixed effect estimator (FE) and also estimate by OLS the equations in first 
differences, but removing country dummies to avoid multicollinearity.  
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5 Capital volatility and unrealised gains and losses 
To test whether capital volatility would have been higher if unrealised gains and losses from 
securities at fair value would have been fully translated into regulatory capital, we compute 
simple volatility measures using both total capital ratios and Tier1 capital ratios. We calculate 
the standard deviation of the observed total capital ratio (upper block in Table 4) and of Tier1 
capital ratio (lower block in Table 4) by bank. We then construct “adjusted” capital ratios by 
adding all unrealised gains and losses that have been effectively filtered into the observed 
ratios and calculate the standard deviation of these adjusted capital ratios10
  
 (”adjusted” 
column in Table 4). We calculate the mean volatility by bank, by country and by year using 
both total and Tier1 capital ratios and for both values of the ratio and compare them. 
TABLE 4. VOLATILITY OF CAPITAL RATIOS.  
EUROPEAN BANKS (2005-2013) 
    
  
Mean capital ratio volatility (1) 
TOTAL   Observed 
 
Adjusted 
 
t ratio 
   by bank   2.41 
 
2.70 
 
6.32 
 
  by country   3.86 
 
4.16 
 
4.87 
 
  by year   4.75 
 
5.00 
 
3.34 
 
  Tier 1   
      
  by bank   2.22 
 
2.52 
 
6.54 
 
  by country   3.70 
 
4.00 
 
2.17 
 
  by year   4.34 
 
4.55 
 
1.98   
(1) Proxied as standard deviation. t-ratio of the null hypothesis that the 
adjusted and unadjusted volatilities are equal  
We expect that the volatility captured by the standard deviation of the adjusted 
capital ratios thus constructed would be larger than the corresponding one for the observed 
variable. As the results in Table 4 show, the inclusion of net unrealised gains and losses 
increases the mean volatility of capital for all the different definitions and such increase is 
statistically significant, as reflected by the t-ratios recorded in the last column. Therefore, we 
could expect that the removal of the filters proposed by Basel III will lead to higher capital 
volatility if banks do not react to counterbalance it. 
                                                                            
10. They are adjusted by net “other comprehensive income”, as a proxy for such unrealized gains and losses. 
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6 The neutralization filter for debt instruments 
The first filter that we analyse is debt neutralisation and we try to establish its effects on 
portfolio composition and regulatory capital.  
6.1 Debt portfolio composition and neutralization 
The dependent variable that is proposed in order to analyse the effects of the neutralisation 
filter on portfolio composition is the proportion of AFS debt over total debt measured at fair 
value that includes available for sale plus held for trading debt (tafsdebt) 11
Bank’s risk attitude could have an impact on the securities portfolio as it would affect 
the level and sources of income. Firm’s tolerance to risk is captured through the variable risk 
that is constructed as the ratio of risk weighted assets over total assets, so that the higher its 
value the lower the risk aversion
.  We would expect 
a positive sign for the prudential filter variable (neutral).   
12
Another independent variable that has been included is a proxy of uncertainty or 
volatility associated to the amount of unrealised gains, as more uncertainty would give rise to 
higher probability of breaching capital requirements. It is computed as the difference of the 
standard deviation of the changes in unrealised gains over time for each bank in relation to 
the average standard deviation of changes in unrealised gains every year (uncertainty). We 
can expect that the larger such deviation, the larger the volatility that unrealised gains and 
losses in AFS assets could potentially introduce in capital. We can expect a negative 
coefficient, as the more isolated is regulatory capital from value uncertainty (the smaller the 
value of uncertainty), the higher the proportion of assets giving rise to such uncertainty those 
banks would be willing to hold.   
. The intrinsic risk associated with a given instrument is 
independent from its allocation to the AFS or HFT portfolio. However, AFS assets allow a 
more prudent liquidity management, so that we could expect that more risk lover banks are 
willing to hold higher proportions of such instruments to compensate. We postulate a positive 
sign for the coefficient in this variable. 
Firm’s size is captured through the natural log of assets (size), expecting a positive 
impact, as the larger the firm the larger the volatility that they are able to admit. Moreover, 
diversification benefits could weight on a firm’s decision to take more AFS assets that give 
rise to uncertain outcomes. The “too-big-to-fail” argument suggests that larger banks would 
benefit from an implicit guarantee that, other things equal, decreases their cost of funding and 
allows them to take more risk. A quadratic variable is also included to capture non linearities 
in this relationship (size2) 
The macroeconomic environment is included through gdp, the real GDP growth 
rate. We could expect that, in a downturn, firms trying to minimise regulatory risk would 
reduce the possible source of capital declines that arises with a high proportion of assets that 
                                                                            
11. We can expect that the larger the proportion of assets that may generate gains or losses in a portfolio of a bank, the 
larger those unrealised gains and losses are going to be. Therefore, the larger the HFT portfolio, the larger the weight of 
unrealised gains or losses in net income and therefore in the P&L account. Net of taxes they will be part of regulatory 
capital. By the same token, the larger the AFT portfolio, the larger the proportion of unrealised gains or losses 
recognised on the balance sheet as other comprehensive income, (so in the revaluation reserve) and only if they are not 
filtered, they will become part of regulatory capital. 
12. Under the assumption that regulatory weights adequately capture risk. 
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may generate losses that are reflected in the regulatory capital ratio. Both, AFS and HFT 
assets do give rise to such losses, but while the impact of HFT on capital is certain, the 
impact arising from AFS depends on the existence of filters. If gains and losses from AFS 
debt are neutralised, we can expect that the cycle will not have an impact on the proportion 
of AFS debt over debt valued at fair value, so that the impact of the economic growth variable 
under neutralization would be nil. To test for such hypothesis with an F-test (F_test_gpd) we 
include a multiplicative variable (neutral*gdp) expecting a similar value than the one obtained 
for the coefficient on gdp but with opposite sign. We could expect either a nil or positive sign 
for gdp, as in a boom unrealised gains may provide some leverage, while in a downturn, 
unrealised losses would be minimised. 
We include in the specification an indicator variable for the existence of interest rate 
contracts that takes value 1 if there are interest rate derivative contracts and zero otherwise 
(int_contract) to proxy for the bank’s hedging activity that may affect the desired investment 
portfolio holdings. The portfolio composition could also be influenced by the overall recorded 
past gains from all securities (past_gains(t-1)) as banks could try to hold those instruments 
that give rise to higher gains. We also test for the inclusion of the proportion of AFS equity 
over total equity at fair value (tafsequi) and for the equity filter (equi_filter) as it could be 
argued that banks could decide on the choice of composition between AFS debt and total 
debt at fair value, taking into account the choice they made for the equity portfolio and its 
corresponding regulatory treatment. 
Finally, we also include a variable that captures the more stringent market conditions 
surrounding the crisis years (crisis). It is a dummy variable that takes value 1 from 2009 to 
2013 and zero, otherwise. It could be the case that banks are affected by market conditions 
in relation to the AFS holdings as a result of the crisis. The higher liquidity tensions associated 
with the crisis would suggest the need to hold a higher proportion of AFS assets, so that the 
expected sign is positive. 
The results of the estimation under Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (col 1), Fixed 
Effects (FE) (col 2) and OLS in first differences (col 3) with robust t-ratios are recorded in Table 
5, where the results for the test of the irrelevance of year dummies (F_test_for_years) and 
country dummies (F_test_for_country) are also included. The specification in first differences 
does not include year dummies as most regulatory changes take place around the same 
year, thus generating multicollinearity.  
The results show a positive and statistically significant sign for the neutralisation filter 
variable, which is in accordance with our hypothesis of bank’s attitude towards regulatory 
risk. Such results imply that if unrealised gains and losses arising from AFS debt are to be 
recognised in regulatory capital, as Basel III is proposing, firms will tend to hold lower 
proportion of these assets than under the regime where neither unrealised losses nor gains 
on AFS debt securities are recognised in regulatory capital. 
As for the rest of the control variables, we find  statistical evidence that larger 
uncertainty in gains is associated with lower holdings of AFS debt, supporting our hypothesis 
that banks try to minimise regulatory risk, as uncertainty could be associated with higher 
capital volatility and thus with an increased probability of breaching the regulatory minimum. 
We also find that the larger the proportion of gains from equity admitted in regulatory capital 
the lower the holdings of AFS debt, and that the higher the AFS equity held the higher the 
AFS debt held, so that both instruments could play a complementary role. In fact, when we 
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run a regression (not shown) where the explained variable is the sum of AFS debt and equity 
over total debt and equity at fair value, we also find that neutralization has a positive impact 
on AFS holdings and the equity filter a negative impact. Contrary to what we could expect, 
past gains show a statistically significant negative impact on the proportion of AFS debt (col 1 
and 3), which could be due to the fact that available data does not allow us to distinguish 
among sources of gains. The results presented in col 4 to 6 in Table 7 show that past gains 
do have a positive impact on AFS equity holdings.  We also find statistical evidence that 
during the crisis years more AFS debt was being held, possibly to ease liquidity management.  
On the other hand, we do not gather evidence of a statistically significant impact of the cycle 
on the share of AFS debt. We obtain the opposite sign for the multiplicative coefficient 
(neutral*gdp) in all cases, but the F tests does not provide support for the hypothesis that 
they cancel each other. So we do not gather evidence that neutralisation isolates capital 
ratios from the economic cycle. So, our results point at GDP growth not playing a role in the 
decisions to distribute debt holdings between the HFT and the AFS portfolio. For the rest of 
the control variable the coefficient is not statistically significant. It therefore seems that the 
presence of a neutralisation filter increases the share of fair value debt that is classified as 
AFS, independently of uncertainty, the hedging activity, past gains, the proportion of AFS 
equity held or the equity regulatory treatment. 
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OLS FE OLS 1st DIFF
VARIABLES tafsdebt(t)  tafsdebt(t)  tafsdebt(t)  
(1) (2) (3)
neutral(t) 10.656*** 11.868*** 4.939***
(3.20) (3.70) (2.85)
risk(t) -0.004 -0.027 0.13
(-0.06) (-0.18) (1.28)
size(t) 6.255 42.259 2.829
(0.59) (1.00) (0.06)
gdp(t) 0.578 0.417 -0.159
(0.73) (0.99) (-0.59)
uncertainty(t) -0.064* -0.134** -0.072*
(-1.84) (-2.49) (-1.72)
neutral*gdp(t) -0.583 -0.592 0.2
(-0.89) (-1.43) (0.68)
size2(t) -0.227 -1.117 0.095
(-0.77) (-0.97) (0.08)
equi_filter(t) -1.786** -1.825*** -0.064
(-2.30) (-3.07) (-0.20)
tafsequi(t) 0.396*** 0.166*** 0.085*
(11.66) (3.06) (1.93)
int_contract(t) -0.039 -3.251 0.528
(-0.02) (-1.22) (0.35)
past_gains(t-1) -2.592*** -0.286 -0.364*
(-3.13) (-0.62) (-1.93)
crisis 4.598 16.479***
(1.19) (4.00)
year_dummies Yes Yes No
country_dummies Yes No No
Observations 981 981 816
Adj_R-sqr 0.462 0.369 0.02
F_test_gdp 0.995 0.708 0.507
F_test_for_years 0.134 0.006
F_test_for_country 0
(1) tafsdebt (equi)=afs debt(equity) over the sum of afs and hft debt(equity);  neutral: dummy variable that takes value 1 
when the bank is allowed to neutralise (exlude) unrealised gains and losses from regulatory capital and 0 otherwise; 
debt (equi)_filter: % of unrealised gains from AFS debt (equity) admitted as capital; int_contract: dummy variable that 
takes value 1 if bank has at time t interest rates derivatives and 0 otherwise;  past_gains: lagged ratio of realised and 
unrealised gains over total asets; kratio*neutral: interaction between kratio (risk based capital ratio) and neutral;  risk: 
risk weighted assets over total assets; size: ln of total assets; gdp: real GPD growth; uncertainty: deviation of standard 
deviation of changes  in recognised and unrecognised gains over total equity by firm; neutral*gdp: interaction variable 
between neutral and gdp;  size2=squared ln of total assets; crisis: dummy variable that takes value 1 if year>= 2009 and 
zero, otherwise. Estimated with annual data of individual banks from 2005 to 2013, being an incomplete panel. Robust t 
ratios in brackets. (*), (**) statistically significant at 10% and 5% level of confidence, respectively.  F_test records p value 
of corresponding F test, where test_gdp tests for gdp+neutral*gdp=0; test_for_years tests for all year dummies=0 and 
_test_country tests for all country dummies=0.
TABLE 5. EFFECT OF THE NEUTRALIZATION FILTER ON THE WEIGHT OF DEBT ASSETS IN BANK 
PORTFOLIO. (2005-2013) (1)
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6.2 Regulatory capital and AFS debt neutralization 
To test for the effects of the neutralisation filter on observed capital ratios we use Tier1 ratio 
over risk weighted assets as the variable to be explained (t1ratio)13
In this equation, we control for bank profits, as they are a source of capital, proxying 
them with the return on average assets that is provided by the SNL dataset (roaa). The 
intuition is that retained earnings are the cheapest way to increase the capital-to-asset ratio, 
so that we would then expect a positive relationship. 
. We would expect a 
negative sign for the prudential filter variable (neutral). 
We use the ratio of net loans to total assets as the measure of bank’s lending activity 
(net loans) and include it as a determinant of bank’s capital. Loans might be more profitable 
than other types of assets such as securities, but might be more costly to produce being 
associated with higher risk and thus requiring higher capital if regulatory risk is a driver of 
bank’s behaviour. Alternatively, banks’ lending activity is associated to traditional banking and 
thus to less risk, thus giving rise to a lower capital buffer. Depending on which effect 
dominates we can obtain a positive or a negative relationship. 
We could expect that banks with a high level of liquid assets in spite of potentially 
receiving lower interest income than banks with less liquid assets, and thus having lower 
profits, are also less risk lovers, so they would also show higher capital ratios. The individual 
banks’ ratio of liquid assets (cash and public debt) to total liabilities (liquidity) is used as a 
proxy of bank liquidity. The expected sign for the coefficient is positive. 
Again, we include the cycle and bank’s size as additional control variables. Larger 
banks have better risk diversification opportunities and thus lower cost of funding than smaller 
ones, so that we could expect a negative relation between capital and size (size). On the 
other hand, we can expect that the cycle (gdp) has a negative impact on the capital ratio, 
generating a procyclical effect, as banks would try to minimise regulatory risk in a downturn, 
while acting less prudently in a boom. The interaction variable neutral*gdp would capture the 
compensating effect under neutralisation. 
The regulatory treatment of alternative financial instruments (equi_filter), besides the 
treatment of debt, could also influence capital decisions. Moreover, a bank can increase 
capital by selecting securities with an average unrealized gain larger than the average for all 
securities in the investment portfolio. So the previously defined past gains on securities 
variable (past_gains(t-1)) is also included in the specification. 
Finally, the dummy variable crisis tries to capture the possible effects of the market 
conditions during the crisis on regulatory capital, which are not captured through the cycle 
variable. 
As was in the case for portfolio composition, the analysis of the effects of 
neutralization on capital ratios, presented in Table 6, is carried out using OLS (col 1), and FE 
(col 2) and OLS in first differences (col 3), to control for individual banks’ effects. We find that 
the coefficient of the dummy variable is negative, as postulated, although not statistically 
significant. We therefore do not find evidence of neutralisation leading to lower capital ratios, 
when compared to an asymmetric treatment. 
                                                                            
13. We do not have information on Pillar 2 capital requirements, which is confidential, so that we cannot measure the 
actual desired buffer.  
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As for the rest of the determinants of capital holdings, we find that profits have the 
expected positive impact on capital as shown from the positive and statistically significant 
sign of roaa. So, higher returns on average assets lead to higher solvency. We also find a 
negative relationship between size and regulatory capital, a result that is usually obtained in 
empirical analysis. The lower capital buffers that larger banks hold could result from moral 
hazard associated to the too big to fail hypothesis. Liquidity has also the expected positive 
sign, when individual effects are controlled for, so that, in general, banks that hold more liquid 
assets also show larger capital buffers. The share of net loans on total assets does not have a 
OLS FE OLS 1st DIFF
VARIABLES t1ratio(t) t1ratio(t) t1ratio(t) 
(1) (2) (3)
neutral(t) -0.423 -0.217 -0.207
(-0.84) (-0.42) (-0.90)
roaa(t) 1.027*** 0.755*** 0.867***
(4.94) (3.22) (4.43)
size(t) -0.656*** -2.645*** -2.836***
(-4.49) (-2.71) (-6.15)
gdp(t) 0.099 0.107 -0.032
(1.01) (1.63) (-1.23)
net_loan(t) -0.080*** -0.038 0.041
(-3.62) (-1.03) (1.15)
liquidity(t) -0.003 0.005 0.133***
(-0.11) (0.10) (4.00)
neutral*gdp(t) -0.092 -0.147** -0.032
(-1.05) (-2.34) (-0.60)
equi_filter(t) 0.06 0.021 0.123*
(0.89) (0.29) (1.77)
past_gains(t-1) 0.994*** 0.35 0.125
(3.24) (1.45) (0.68)
crisis 3.002*** 1.467***
(3.55) (3.49)
year_dummies Yes Yes No
country_dummies Yes No No
Observations 758 758 641
Adj_R-sqr 0.396 0.352 0.308
F_test_gdp 0.936 0.596 0.996
F_test_for_years 0 0
F_test_for_country 0
TABLE 6. EFFECT OF THE NEUTRALIZATION FILTER ON THE REGULATORY CAPITAL RATIO. 
(2005-2013) (1)
(1) t1ratio:tier1 capital ratio; neutral: dummy variable that takes value 1 when the bank is allowed to neutralise 
(exlude) unrealised gains and losses from regulatory capital and 0 otherwise; equi(debt)_filter: % of 
unrealised gains from AFS equity (debt) admitted as capital; past_gains: lagged ratio of realised and 
unrealised gains over total asets; roaa: net income over average assets (SNL); size: ln of total assets; gdp: 
GPD growth; net loans: % of net loans over assets ; liquidity: cash and public debt over liabilities; neutral*gdp: 
interaction variable between neutral and gdp; crisis: dummy variable that takes value 1 if year>= 2009 and zero, 
otherwise. Estimated with annual data of individual banks from 2005 to 2013, being an incomplete panel. 
Robust t ratios in brackets. (*), (**) statistically significant at 10% and 5% level of confidence, respectively. 
F_test records p value of corresponding F test, where test_gdp tests for gdp+neutral*gdp=0; test_for_years 
tests for all year dummies=0 and _test_country tests for all country dummies=0.
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clear effect on Tier1 capital. In fact, when the coefficient of net_loan is statistically significant 
(col 1) it shows a negative sign. It therefore seems that the size of the traditional business line 
could affect decisions on capital, so that the more traditional the business line is, the lower 
the regulatory capital that we will observe. Moreover, past gains seem to have a positive 
impact on the capital ratio but also only when the estimation is carried out without taking into 
account individual banks’ effects (col 1. Finally, the dummy crisis is also statistically significant 
and it shows a positive sign, so that higher capital ratios were observed during the crisis 
years. We do not find evidence that the cycle or the regulatory treatment of equity does 
impact capital. 
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7 Asymmetric treatment of unrealized gains and losses of AFS instruments 
The role of an asymmetric filter on portfolio composition and capital is addressed next. For 
debt, we use, as before, the ratio of AFS debt over total debt at fair value (tafsdebt). For 
equity, we define the variable tafsequi as the share of AFS equity over total equity at fair 
value.  We can expect that lower or reductions in the asymmetric filters (debt_filter and 
equi_filter) would result in lower AFS securities and higher capital. 
7.1 Portfolio composition and asymmetric filters 
The results of the analysis of the impact of the asymmetric filters on AFS debt and equity 
holdings estimated with OLS (col 1, and 4), with FE (col 2 and 5) and with OLS in first 
differences (col 3 and 6) is presented in Table 7.  
In particular, cols 1 to 3 report the results for the debt portfolio and show that the 
debt filter has the expected positive and statistically significant coefficient, so that the higher 
the unrealised gains from debt allowed to be included in regulatory capital, the lower the 
holdings of AFS debt in banks’ portfolio as to avoid increased uncertainty.  On the other 
hand, the results obtained for the effects on the equity portfolio (cols 4 to 6) show that only 
when the estimation is carried out in first differences the equity filter has a negative and 
statistically significant impact.  The lack of statistical significance of the coefficient of the filter 
variable in the estimation does not support the hypothesis that removing filters would result in 
less AFS equity.  So, the asymmetric filter seems to have the expected effect mainly on debt 
portfolio.  
Rather similar results in the debt portfolio equation are obtained for the rest of the 
explanatory variables, as when neutralization was being tested, although the statistical 
significance of some of them declines. The main differences arise in two control variables: on 
the one hand, the interaction between neutrality and growth is statistically significant (col 1 
and 2) and in fact, the hypothesis that under neutralization the cycle does not affect the 
decision on the proportion of AFS debt that banks hold cannot be rejected (col 2, 
F_test_gdp); and on the other, uncertainty appears as statistically significant, but with a 
positive coefficient, in contrast to the results recorded in cols 1 and 2 of this same Table 7 
and the results in Table 5. The high correlation between uncertainty, some specific years, and 
growth could explain such positive coefficient. In fact, when the year dummies are dropped, 
we again get a negative sign for this variable.  
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As for the control variables in the equity portfolio equation, we find statistical 
evidence that hedging activity affects the proportion of AFS equity that banks hold. In 
particular, the presence of interest rate derivative contracts results in higher AFS equity 
holdings.  We also find evidence that past gains have a positive impact on the proportion of 
AFS equity that banks hold, in contrast to the negative impact obtained for AFS debt, a result 
that could be reflecting that the main source of such gains is AFS equity. We also find 
evidence that the regulatory treatment of debt and the proportion of AFS debt affect AFS 
equity holdings in a similar fashion as the regulatory treatment of equity and the proportion of 
OLS FE OLS 1st DIFF OLS FE
OLS 1st 
DIFF
VARIABLES tafsdebt(t)  tafsdebt(t)  tafsdebt(t)  tafsequi(t)  tafsequi(t)  tafsequi(t)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
debt_filter(t) -0.170*** -0.182*** -0.039** -0.074 -0.099** -0.028
(-2.88) (-3.90) (-1.97) (-1.20) (-2.41) (-1.12)
equi_filter(t) -1.024 -0.967* -0.359 0.339 0.04 -0.676**
(-1.34) (-1.67) (-0.97) (0.44) (0.07) (-2.05)
risk(t) -0.002 -0.016 0.093 0.055 -0.037 -0.042
(-0.03) (-0.10) (0.92) (0.91) (-0.31) (-0.33)
size(t) 6.162 39.663 3.25 35.900*** 32.814 2.586
(0.58) (0.91) (0.07) (3.94) (0.90) (0.06)
gdp(t) 0.514 0.356 -0.129 -0.937 -1.409* 0.149
(0.65) (0.81) (-0.30) (-1.05) (-1.78) (0.26)
uncertainty(t) -0.061* -0.614*** 0.302*** 0.077** -0.097 0.192
(-1.83) (-5.36) (2.97) (2.09) (-0.89) (1.56)
neutral*gdp(t) -1.154* -1.230*** -0.329 0.423 0.111 -0.51
(-1.75) (-2.87) (-1.21) (0.61) (0.21) (-1.56)
size2(t) -0.224 -1.039 0.033 -1.158*** -1.044 -0.274
(-0.76) (-0.88) (0.03) (-4.55) (-1.03) (-0.21)
int_contract(t) -0.161 -3.648 0.227 5.012** 5.032* 6.295**
(-0.08) (-1.38) (0.14) (2.20) (1.82) (2.35)
past_gains(t-1) -2.711*** -0.424 -0.356* 0.595 0.706* 0.854***
(-3.39) (-0.87) (-1.65) (0.52) (1.78) (3.56)
equifv(t) 0.397*** 0.169*** 0.065
(11.68) (3.06) (1.45)
debtfv(t) 0.429*** 0.176*** 0.092
(11.00) (2.77) (1.46)
crisis 7.277** -7.910**
(1.97) (-2.08)
year_dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
country_dummies Yes No No Yes No No
Observations 981 981 816 981 981 816
Adj_R-sqr 0.462 0.363 0.035 0.396 0.176 0.063
F_test_gdp 0.421 0.089 0.759 0.52 0.042 0.417
F_test_for_years 0.265 0 0 0.636 0.02 0.011
F_test_for_country 0 0
(1)See notes in Table 5
TABLE 7. EFFECT OF THE ASYMMETRIC FILTER ON THE WEIGHT OF AFS DEBT OR EQUITY IN 
BANKS PORTFOLIO. (2005-2013) (1)
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AFS equity held affects AFS debt portfolio: the regulatory treatment has a negative impact on 
AFS equity and the debt holdings have a positive impact. The bank’s size also seems to 
affect the proportion of AFS equity held. In particular, in the specification that does not control 
for fixed effects, the variable size appears as positive and statistically significant which can 
interpreted as indicating that larger banks tend to adopt more volatile but also more liquid 
portfolios in terms of AFS equity, but at a declining rate, as reflected by the negative sign in 
size2.  Finally, during the crisis years, the holdings of AFS equity declined, in contrast to AFS 
debt, that increased.  
7.2 Regulatory capital and asymmetric filters 
The effect of asymmetric filters on the level of banks’ Tier1 capital ratios is recorded in Table 8 
and again analysed with OLS (col 1, and 4), with FE (col 2 and 5) and with OLS in first 
differences (col 3 and 6).  Cols 1 to 3 reflect the effects of the debt filter on regulatory capital 
where we have restricted the population to banks operating in jurisdictions that do not allow 
neutralisation in order to isolate the effect of the quantity of unrealised gains allowed to be 
included in capital. Cols 4 to 6 reflect the effects of the equity filter on capital ratios. 
The results suggest that, in accordance with our hypothesis, the impact on 
regulatory capital of the asymmetric filter on debt instrument is positive, and statistically 
significant, but only when banks unobservable heterogeneity is taken into account (cols 2 
and 3). Such results indicate that the debt filter has an effect on observed capital ratios, so 
that the higher the proportion of unrealised gains admitted as regulatory capital, the higher 
the capital ratio that banks will hold.  In particular, these results tell us that the removal of 
asymmetric filters on unrealised gains and losses on debt could lead to larger regulatory 
capital ratios.  
On the other hand, the equity filter does not have a statistically significant effect on 
capital holdings, which may result from the low weight that such instruments have on banks’ 
portfolio. So we could expect that the removal of asymmetric filters on unrealised gains and 
losses on equity would not necessarily lead to larger regulatory capital ratios. 
For the rest of the determinants of Tier1 capital ratio, the results show for most of 
them the expected sign, so that we find empirical evidence that profits have a positive impact 
on bank’s capital, while size has a negative impact. As for the business line, the ratio of net 
loans appears again with a negative sign, so that the more focused on traditional activities a 
bank is the lower the capital ratio it holds, although it is not statistically significant if banks’ 
fixed effects are accounted for. Again, if unobservable heterogeneity is not taken into 
account, past gains positively affect capital. We also find evidence that the crisis resulted in 
higher capital ratios.  
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OLS FE OLS 1st DIFF OLS FE OLS 1st DIFF
VARIABLES
t1ratio(t) when 
neutral filter=0
t1ratio(t) when 
neutral filter=0
t1ratio(t) when 
neutral filter=0 t1ratio(t) t1ratio(t) t1ratio(t) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
debt_filter(t) 0.147 0.186** 0.232***
(1.36) (2.17) (2.65)
equi_filter(t) 0.042 0.012 0.116
(0.68) (0.19) (1.59)
roaa(t) 1.189*** 0.713*** 1.025*** 1.032*** 0.758*** 0.857***
(3.41) (4.29) (3.47) (4.97) (3.24) (4.38)
size(t) -0.770*** -3.900*** -2.565** -0.659*** -2.669*** -1.589
(-2.60) (-3.53) (-2.02) (-4.51) (-2.76) (-1.40)
gdp(t) 0.025 0.054 0.046 0.089 0.101 0.058
(0.15) (0.67) (0.58) (0.92) (1.64) (1.02)
net_loan(t) -0.101** -0.064 0.031 -0.080*** -0.038 0.048
(-2.48) (-1.00) (0.62) (-3.61) (-1.03) (1.30)
liquidity(t) -0.019 0.043 0.092** -0.003 0.005 0.122***
(-0.46) (0.85) (2.24) (-0.11) (0.10) (3.67)
neutral*gdp(t) -0.074 -0.138** -0.012
(-0.86) (-2.07) (-0.26)
past_gains(t-1) 1.390*** 0.165 0.303 0.997*** 0.352 0.145
(10.44) (1.18) (1.34) (3.24) (1.48) (0.75)
crisis 2.504*** 1.345***
(4.55) (4.49)
year_dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
country_dummies Yes No No Yes No No
Observations 290 290 217 758 758 632
Adj_R-sqr 0.495 0.397 0.236 0.397 0.352 0.186
F_test_gdp 0.867 0.634 0.417
F_test_for_years 0 0 0.293 0 0 0.064
F_test_for_country 0 0
TABLE 8. EFFECT OF THE UNREALISED GAINS ASYMMETRIC FILTER ON REGULATORY CAPITAL 
RATIOS. (2005-2013) (1)
(1)See notes in Table 6 
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8  Robustness tests 
We next present a series of robustness checks for the different hypothesis that we have 
tested. First we carry out robustness checks for the effects of both types of filters on the 
portfolio composition and then move to the capital equation. 
8.1 Effects on portfolio 
In order to control for the effects that could arise because of the use of accounting data, we 
present in Table 9 the results obtained when the three types of regressions (OLS, FE, OLS in 
first diff) are run with all explanatory variables, except the filter variable and the crisis years 
lagged one period. The first three columns test for the relevance of the neutralization filter on 
debt portfolio14
In all these cases, the sign and statistical significance of the coefficient for the filter 
variables do not change in relation to the results already recorded: banks subject to 
neutralization show a larger proportion of AFS debt in their debt portfolio and the higher the 
amount of unrealised gains from debt allowed being included in capital, the lower the 
proportion of AFS debt in the debt portfolio. Moreover, there is evidence of a negative effect 
of the asymmetric equity filter on AFS equity, but such evidence is not systematic.   
, columns 4 to 6 present the results for the asymmetric debt filter on the debt 
portfolio, as well, and columns 7 to 9 the results of the effects of the equity filter on the equity 
portfolio. The control variables are the ones used in Tables 5 and 7. 
We can therefore expect changes in debt portfolio composition arising from the 
removal of the filters and possible changes also in equity portfolio. 
   
 
  
                                                                            
14. Similar results are obtained when we restrict the sample to those banks operating in jurisdictions that did not allow 
neutralization before 2007. 
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OLS FE OLS 1st DIFF OLS FE
OLS 1st 
DIFF OLS FE
OLS 1st 
DIFF
VARIABLES tafsdebt(t)  tafsdebt(t)  tafsdebt(t)  tafsdebt(t)  tafsdebt(t)  tafsdebt(t)  tafsequi(t)  tafsequi(t)  tafsequi(t)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
neutral(t) 10.192*** 13.057*** 4.090**
(2.62) (4.14) (2.32)
debt_filter(t-1) -0.119* -0.152*** -0.033* -0.075 -0.078** -0.016
(-1.73) (-3.33) (-1.81) (-1.10) (-2.21) (-0.76)
equi_filter(t) -2.176** -2.283*** -0.183 -1.666 -1.613*** -0.725** 0.053 -0.348 -0.916**
(-2.15) (-5.10) (-0.87) (-1.65) (-3.84) (-2.33) (0.05) (-0.74) (-2.43)
risk(t-1) 0.001 -0.022 0.055 0 -0.018 -0.045 0.148** 0.088 0.238**
(0.01) (-0.14) (0.52) (-0.00) (-0.11) (-0.41) (2.25) (0.82) (2.13)
size(t-1) 10.669 49.299 15.978 10.85 57.623 27.035 0.181 45.612 -7.787
(0.92) (1.22) (0.57) (0.94) (1.37) (1.03) (0.03) (1.54) (-0.85)
gdp(t-1) 1.368 1.117* 0.227 1.235 1.002 0.531 -0.407 -0.756 -0.196
(1.48) (1.67) (0.93) (1.36) (1.56) (1.47) (-0.48) (-1.51) (-0.43)
uncertainty(t-1) -0.043 -0.594*** 0.056* -0.04 -0.662*** 0.297*** 0.071** -0.181* 0.197**
(-1.39) (-5.52) (1.66) (-1.32) (-6.26) (4.56) (2.03) (-1.68) (2.22)
neutral*gdp(t-1) -0.86 -1.010** -0.252 -0.693 -0.781* -0.25 0.331 0.183 -0.24
(-1.23) (-2.07) (-0.92) (-1.00) (-1.74) (-0.99) (0.48) (0.57) (-0.94)
size2(t-1) -0.352 -1.328 -0.31 -0.356 -1.514 -0.754 -1.311 0.272
(-1.10) (-1.21) (-0.41) (-1.12) (-1.34) (-1.07) (-1.57) (0.85)
debtifv(t-1) 0.431*** 0.163*** 0.011
(10.78) (2.81) (0.21)
equifv(t-1) 0.377*** 0.119** 0.014 0.379*** 0.128** -0.002
(10.18) (2.29) (0.45) (10.23) (2.38) (-0.07)
int_contract(t-1) -0.289 -3.583 -1.133 -0.385 -4.119* -2.435* 3.648 -0.387 -3.526**
(-0.13) (-1.44) (-0.83) (-0.17) (-1.67) (-1.71) (1.51) (-0.19) (-2.25)
past_gains(t-2) -2.421*** -0.079 0.319 -2.521*** -0.25 0.282 -0.722 -0.016 -0.269
(-2.90) (-0.19) (1.49) (-2.94) (-0.54) (1.41) (-0.86) (-0.04) (-0.60)
year_dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
country_dummies Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No
Observations 820 820 668 820 820 668 820 820 668
Adj_R-sqr 0.439 0.342 0.002 0.436 0.321 0.031 0.393 0.131 0.052
F_test_gdp 0.559 0.794 0.342 0.539 0.585 0.172 0.926 0.213 0.947
F_test_for_years 0 0 0 0 0 0.501 0.002 0.006
F_test_for_country 0 0 0
(1)See notes in Table 5
TABLE 9. ROBUSTNESS TEST FOR THE EFFECTS OF THE NEUTRALIZATION AND ASYMMETRIC FILTER ON THE WEIGHT OF 
AFS DEBT OR EQUITY IN BANKS PORTFOLIO. (2005-2013) (1)
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8.2 Effects on capital 
As for the robustness checks of the effects of the filters on the capital equation, we present 
the results obtained for neutralization in Table 10 and for the asymmetric filters in Table 11. In 
both cases, we first test whether it is not Tier 1 capital, but total capital that is affected by the 
treatment of unrealised gains and losses arising from debt instruments, so that we estimate 
the capital equation using total capital (kratio) as the variable to be explained. We then also 
carry out the estimation using lagged values of the explanatory variables (except the dummy 
variables for the filters and the crisis years) so as to control for the use of accounting data. 
As recorded in cols 1 to 3 of Table 10, the results previously obtained and recorded 
in Table 6 do not change: the debt neutralisation filter does not impact capital ratios, neither 
when we look at Tier 1 nor when the impact is on total  regulatory capital. By the same token, 
when lagged explanatory variables are used as regressors (cols 4 to 6 in Table 10), these 
results do not change: we cannot find statistical evidence of neutralization impacting the 
capital ratio. 
As for the effects of the asymmetric debt filter on capital, we again restrict the 
analysis to the banks which operate in jurisdictions that do not neutralise (col 1 to 6 in Table 
11) so as to interpret the results in terms of the value of the asymmetric filter.  
The results recorded in columns 1 to 3 in Table 11 do not find evidence that the debt 
filter affects total capital, as it did with Tier 1 capital ratios.  This could support the hypothesis 
that banks build quality capital in the face of the uncertainty of breaching regulatory 
requirements, associated to the regulatory treatment of unrealised gains on debt. On the 
other hand, the results obtained with lagged explanatory variables (cols 4 to 6) support the 
initial results when we control for banks’ unobserved heterogeneity: Tier 1 capital increases 
with the proportion of unrealised gains allowed to be accepted as regulatory capital.    
The results of the robustness test for the effects of the equity filter on the AFS equity 
portfolio are recorded in cols 7 to 12 of Table 11. Either when the variable to be explained is 
the total capital ratio (cols 7 to 9) or when the explanatory variables are lagged one period 
(cols 10 to 12) the qualitative result is the same: we still do not find evidence that the 
treatment of unrealised gains and losses from equity affect regulatory capital ratios.  
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OLS FE OLS 1st DIFF OLS(2) FE(2) OLS 1st DIFF(2)
VARIABLES kratio(t) kratio(t) kratio(t) t1ratio(t) t1ratio(t) t1ratio(t) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
neutral(t) -0.511 -0.096 -0.053 -0.074 -0.158 -0.375
(-0.97) (-0.17) (-0.19) (-0.14) (-0.39) (-1.55)
equi_filter(t) 0.107 0.108 0.118 0.017 -0.032 0.086
(1.28) (1.38) (1.30) (0.19) (-0.38) (1.04)
roaa(t) 0.903*** 0.821*** 0.799*** 0.777*** 0.289 -0.19
(4.60) (3.49) (4.09) (3.18) (1.03) (-0.77)
size(t) -0.549*** -2.798*** -2.650*** -0.674*** -2.163*** -0.257
(-3.92) (-3.25) (-5.75) (-4.14) (-2.63) (-0.63)
gdp(t) 0.214** 0.167** -0.062* 0.147 0.179** 0.047
(2.02) (2.24) (-1.80) (1.27) (2.57) (1.37)
net_loan(t) -0.061*** -0.008 0.047 -0.120*** -0.107*** -0.098***
(-2.85) (-0.22) (1.26) (-4.77) (-3.30) (-2.91)
liquidity(t) 0.016 0.015 0.131*** -0.042* -0.088* -0.086***
(0.71) (0.27) (3.72) (-1.66) (-1.92) (-2.67)
neutral*gdp(t) -0.108 -0.118 0.005 -0.099 -0.146* -0.137**
(-1.20) (-1.60) (0.09) (-1.00) (-1.78) (-2.06)
past_gains(t-1) 0.866*** 0.353 0.114 0.605*** -0.112 -0.144
(3.20) (1.37) (0.59) (2.86) (-0.61) (-1.05)
crisis 3.765*** 1.715*** 3.429*** 3.658***
(4.12) (3.57) (3.47) (5.27)
year_dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
country_dummies Yes No No Yes No No
Observations 759 759 642 641 641 527
Adj_R-sqr 0.355 0.295 0.238 0.39 0.363 0.055
F_test_gdp 0.305 0.553 0.448 0.691 0.759 0.044
F_test_for_years 0 0 0 0
F_test_for_country 0 0
TABLE 10. ROBUSTNESS TESTS FOR THE EFFECT OF THE NEUTRALIZATION FILTER ON 
REGULATORY CAPITAL  (1)
(1)See notes in Table 6. kratio:risk based capital ratio; 
(2) Explanatory variables are lagged one period, except for neutral, debt_filter, equi_filter and crisis.
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9 Conclusions  
Prudential regulators depart from some of the accounting rules to define the components of 
regulatory capital, setting filters for prudential purposes so as to preserve the loss absorbing 
capacity of capital. Currently, European jurisdictions can choose between neutralising 
unrealised losses and gains from fixed income instruments, so that such value changes do 
not affect regulatory capital or they can choose an asymmetric filter for both debt and equity 
instruments, by which losses are always accounted for while unrealised gains can only 
compute as regulatory capital with a haircut. 
The proposal contained in Basel III to remove all prudential filters of unrealised gains 
and losses of instruments at fair value arises as a result from the debate on whether they have 
been an obstacle to the early identification of problems during the crisis. On the other hand, 
banks have raised concerns about the effects of the increased volatility of capital ratios that 
such change would imply, as, with the objective of minimising such volatility in the face of 
increased regulatory risk banks may be induced to hold larger buffers and to reduce their 
demand for fixed term securities.  
This study provides empirical evidence for European banks of a) the possible impact 
on capital volatility of introducing in its computation unrealised gains and losses arising from 
Available For Sale securities; b) the effect of these prudential filters on the demand for assets 
to be held as AFS and c) the impact of such filters on regulatory capital.  
We find that adjusting past observed banks’ capital ratios with observed unrealised 
gains and losses results in more capital volatility, ceteris paribus. We can thus expect that the 
removal of all filters could be accompanied by higher volatility in capital ratios. As far as banks 
are concerned with regulatory risk, such increased volatility could result in changes in 
investment and capital strategy. In fact, our findings suggest that the regulatory treatment of 
unrealised gains and losses affects banks’ behaviour.  
In particular, we gather evidence that if unrealised gains and losses from fixed 
income securities are neutralised, and thus not recognised in regulatory capital, banks tend to 
hold a higher proportion of these assets in relation to securities valued at fair value than if 
losses are recognised and gains are not or only partially accepted. We could therefore expect 
that if the possibility of neutralisation is removed, we will observe a decline in AFS holdings of 
debt instruments, most of which are sovereign bonds. Given that banks provide a large part 
of the demand of long-term government securities, we could expect a contraction of trading 
in these markets. We could also expect costly changes in liquidity management as the decline 
in the incentive to devote excess liquidity to fixed income securities would require redefining 
investment strategies. In particular, the removal of filters could result in more assets being 
classified as held to maturity, impairing liquidity by the classification of assets in that portfolio. 
It could even affect banks’ ability to lend. 
We have gathered evidence that the impact of the asymmetric filter for debt 
instruments, where losses are fully recognised while gains are only partially included in 
regulatory capital, on banks’ decisions is channelled both through capital ratios and through 
investment composition. In particular, we have found that the size of the filter for gains on 
debt instruments negatively affects the proportion of AFS debt that banks hold in relation to 
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these assets held at fair value. Therefore, the removal of the current asymmetric filter for debt 
instruments would reduce the weight of AFS debt over total debt at fair value, reinforcing the 
effect of the change from neutralisation to full recognition of gains and losses.  
We also gathered evidence that under an asymmetric framework the size of the filter 
for debt instruments positively affects the amount of Tier 1 regulatory capital that banks hold. 
Removing such asymmetric filter will thus result in larger capital ratios. 
On the other hand, we could not gather robust evidence that the regulatory 
treatment of unrealized gains and losses from equity impacts either the distribution of equity 
between the AFS and the Held for Trading portfolio or the standard capital ratio. However, 
our findings suggest that the equity portfolio could be marginally affected when the removal 
takes place, resulting in lower AFS equity holdings. 
In fact, the results obtained for capital and portfolio composition are aligned with the 
hypothesis that banks’ main concern is capital volatility, which will certainly increase with the 
proposed removal of prudential filters, and the higher probability of breaching regulatory ratios 
associated to such volatility. 
The accompanying higher risk sensitivity and higher transparency that the removal of 
these filters will generate need to be analysed if the benefits are also to be considered. In fact, 
these effects would be especially welcomed during a crisis, when unrealised losses tend to 
accumulate, so that the presence of filters would mask the actual solvency position of banks. 
In particular, without filters, losses would be fully transferred to capital and there will be no 
incentives to accumulate assets that become illiquid as banks try to delay the recognition of 
losses in income until very late. The analysis of such improvements in corporate governance 
and in the provision of early warnings of possible problems is not addressed in this article. On 
the other hand, such recognition would intensify procyclicality in capital ratios, thus generating 
financial stability concerns. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1 Observations by jurisdiction 
country 
maximum number of 
banks 
 
maximum number  
of observations 
  Austria 12 91 
Belgium 5 41 
Cyprus 4 27 
Finland 5 40 
France 6 45 
Germany 21 143 
Ireland 3 20 
Italy 32 261 
Luxembourg 4 27 
Malta 2 14 
Netherland 10 79 
Norway 10 58 
Portugal 7 54 
Slovakia 4 22 
Slovenia 3 23 
Spain 20 117 
United Kingdom 11 80 
   TOTAL 159 1142 
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